PH.D
Question: Over the past 100 years, the field of public administration has addressed a wide range of questions and problems. These questions include, but are not limited to, the following: the identification of PA as a separate discipline; the balance of efficiency and representativeness (accountability); the search for an appropriate paradigm for public administration; and the relationship between politics and administration. Of the issues mentioned, which is the most important? To date, what do we know about that issue? What issues remain unresolved or unanswered? Finally, make a case for which of these questions we should devote our time and attention to in the future. Draw upon relevant literature to justify your choices.
In attempting to answer this broad question, I wish to first explain what I interpret the question to be. I will then sketch my path answering it.
As I see the question, it (1) asks me to critically evaluate and discuss each of the four listed issues in public administration (PA). Although there are an infinite number of issues that could be addressed, these four issues are intimately related to PA at a very foundational level. I must then (2) assess which of these four issues is the most important in my understanding of PA and why that is so. I must explain and analyze that issue in terms of what we know and do not know about it using relevant PA literature. Finally, I must (3) build an argument using PA literature for which of these four issues PA scholars should devote their time and attention to in the future.
To accomplish this goal, I will briefly address each of the four issues in terms of their historical and developmental context. I will then identify which one of these four issues is most important in my understanding of PA and why. Here I will more greatly develop the issue and its ramifications. Finally, I will take one of these four issues and argue that it should be preeminent on the minds of PA scholars in their search for a better PA. The following outline provides more detail of this process:
Let us begin with the first issue: the identification of PA as a separate discipline. Compared to many of the natural sciences which had strong paradigmatic foundations since the Middle Ages, PA is a young and developing discipline. Even though it can trace some of its roots to ancient times1, as a discipline (or a developing discipline), it could be argued that it is still in its infancy and fighting for survival (see recent Public Administration Review [PAR] article by Robert T. Golembiewski asking whether PA is at the dawn of a new day or at the end of a short stay in the sun).
PA has a multi-disciplinary past with tap roots that extend especially deep into political science, economics, sociology, management, and cognitive psychology. The literature abounds with references to scholars in these and related fields (examples include Abraham Maslow, James Buchanan, Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, Alexis de Tocqueville, Publius [The Federalist Papers], Ledwig von Bertalanffy, Thomas Kuhn, Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud, Karl Popper, Warren Bennis, etc.). This multi-disciplinary past is often evident today in universities across the nation. Simply look where PA is housed. In many institutions, it is housed in the Political Science Department (as it is here at Mississippi State University). In others, it is housed with the Business School, or the Management Department. It is rarely found as an autonomous department.
However, many in PA desire such academic autonomy. Perhaps Nicholas Henry, who describes five paradigms2 that PA has gone through in its development as a discipline, would argue that it is autonomous today. Henry starts with the politics-administration dichotomy paradigm (1900-1926) and moves to the principles of administration paradigm (1926-1948). Then PA went to a time when it was the paradigm of political science (1950-1970). Almost simultaneous to this period, PA was also considered to be a management paradigm (1956-1970). Finally, since 1970 (to present), PA is a PA paradigm.
Other scholars feel that PA cannot exist independent of its founding disciplines. Recent PAR and Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory (JPART) articles show that this debate still rages, particularly between those that wish for PA and political science to share a single discipline. Eliza Wing-yee Lee (PAR 1997) discusses some of the academic development of the discipline in the United States and some of this sentiment. I recall reading a mid 1990s article in which the supposed "cleft" between PA and political science was discussed and analyzed as to whether it truly exists.
The balance of efficiency and representativeness (accountability) is indeed a very foundational issue for PA. Since PA's inception as a discipline (or at least a recognized sub-discipline of political science), Woodrow Wilson in 1887 was aware of this tension between competing values. Various ways have been devised over the years to deal with the values of efficiency and accountability. For example, Herbert Simon (mid 1940s) felt that efficiency could be separated from value. He described the "goodness" or "badness" of something in relation to its ability to efficiently address organizational goals. He did not see this arrangement as value-laden.
In contrast to Simon and during this time, Robert Dahl argued that PA could not be a science because it deals with values. Efficiency and democracy are values and in a positivist scientific tradition, do not measure up to the rigors required in a value-free science. Dahl argued that PA would have to find a way to deal with the normative issues before it could ever become a science. To further make it difficult for PA to become a science, the very fact that PA deals with humans makes it suspect of ever achieving science status. Humans do not always act rationally, Dahl argued, and therefore, PA's involvement with humans takes it out of the realm of science. There is also no way to scientifically compare across cultures any "principles" since they are context-sensitive--another barrier to PA becoming a science according to Dahl.
Move on to 1948 and Dwight Waldo and The Administrative State. He also attacked the "gospel of efficiency." It seems that during the 1940s, the old "principles of administration" (discussed more under issue #4) and the value-free notions of scientific management and Simon's fact-value dichotomy were falling under attack. They would soon be replaced with an emphasis on understanding organizational actors and decision-making.
The search for an appropriate paradigm for public administration is one of those areas that may never be satisfied. Let's define paradigm. Denhardt in one of his books describes a paradigm as a model or a schema that provides a basis on which to hang theory. It guides the questions that can and should be asked within its framework. It provides standardized methods and tools for its adherents to view and evaluate evidence.
Perhaps the premier writer on the subject of paradigms is Thomas Kuhn for his book entitled The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (written in the early 1960s). Even though Kuhn expresses doubt that the social sciences can truly possess a paradigm, his work has found a strong following within PA.
Kuhn shows how a paradigm develops when an idea attracts enough adherents to become a basis or foundation on which to build theory. The paradigm thrives and directs and filters research until sufficient anomalies develop to threaten the paradigm. Sometimes anomaly provides an opportunity for the paradigm to grow when a new way is found to describe the anomalies within the paradigm. Sometimes anomaly causes the paradigm to be rejected in favor of another paradigm that can describe the anomaly (and also existing knowledge) in a new way. The new paradigm offers new questions, may provide new tools, and further directs and guides research.
The search for a paradigm for PA is a big issue and will be covered more fully later in this essay. In fact, I would argue that this question can be classified as one of the "big questions" of PA (see Neumann's [1996] and Kirklin's [1996] PAR articles addressing the "big questions" as posed by Behn [1995] in PAR for more on this subject). Many scholars discuss paradigm research and/or attempt to argue that PA has one or does not. Recent examples include Robert Golembiewski (who uses [some argue misuses] the concept of miniparadigms), Vincent Ostrom, and Denhardt.
The relationship between politics and administration is a classic issue in PA. Many trace this issue right back to Woodrow Wilson and his 1887 publication that is argued to promote the politics administration dichotomy. Skip ahead to 1900 and read Frank Goodnow for more on this supposed dichotomy. Leonard White, who in 1926 published the first PA textbook, provides another example of a scholar who felt their was or at least should be a politics administrative dichotomy.3
Paul Appleby in 1940 was one of the first writers to thoroughly reject the politics administration dichotomy as impossible. We could fast forward to Michael Lipsky in the 1980s and his "street-level bureaucrat" book to demonstrate that administrators influence and yes, even make policy. The policy administration dichotomy seems to me to be one of the most thoroughly attacked and dismissed notions found in PA today.
The crack in the politics administration dichotomy armor can perhaps first be found in Luther Gulick's caveamus expertum when he suggested that the "principles of administration" have their "pitfalls." Philip Selznick and Herbert Kaufman provided further attacks on this notion.
The house of cards of the "classic school" came tumbling down when Herbert Simon, though, published Administrative Behavior. I think we could successfully argue that Simon pointed out what we really should be looking at in an organization: decision making. While he argued for a bounded or limited version of rational decision making, the process nevertheless has strong implications on policy and administration. And contrary to Simon's fact-value dichotomy, others such as Dahl and Kaufman would disagree that there can be no such thing.
Other scholars have looked at politics and administration as values, aspects, or components of PA. H. George Frederickson looked at these values in his 1997 PAR comparison of the Reinventing Government notion to that of the New PA. He argued that there is a citizens (New PA) vs. customers (Reinventing Government) twist to these values today. He suggests that it is almost as if aspects of the politics administration dichotomy are being revised in order to run government more like a business so the "customers" can be happy.
Now let's switch gears and address the second part of the question: which of these four issues is the most important in my understanding of PA and why? I feel that issue #3, the search for an appropriate paradigm for PA, is most important in my understanding of PA. I feel that this issue is essential for the field of PA. We must know who we are in order to advance as a discipline. We must know who we are in order to prescribe. It is impossible to appreciate and understand PA at a deep level without studying its philosophical and epistemological underpinnings. If there is no paradigm, then there is no strong basis for hanging theory on and defining what questions to ask.
Kuhn so vividly points out the value of a paradigm in acting as a shorthand method for facilitating research. Kuhn used the example of Benjamin Franklin and electricity before there was a paradigm dealing with electricity. In the pre-paradigmatic days prior to Franklin, all electricians, as they were called, were forced to start at the beginning (reinvent and explain all their research) and work toward some goal in their research. After Franklin's ideas were accepted as a paradigm for electricity, the electricians had a foundation upon which to build. They did not have to describe essentially everything from the beginning since it was already done by the paradigm. They could begin performing specialized research, ask ordered questions, and conduct paradigmatically-directed work. They could publish their work in esoteric journals since there was now an elite group interested in such. Advances could be made within the paradigm that were impossible without it. Furthermore, research was guided by the new questions posed within Franklin's paradigm.
PA needs to possess a paradigm for a similar reason. PA would greatly benefit from a foundation, one that is essentially not questioned, on which to build theory. PA would benefit from the ordered questions that flow from a paradigm and a new and unified set of tools. The benefits are enormous; many would agree that the stakes are also high. Although Kuhn expressed doubts in the social sciences ability to form paradigms, others disagree and are working diligently in this regard.
A great deal of work is being done on the "science of knowing" and the philosophical foundations of PA. The decline of the positivist tradition in PA has opened the way for new interpretations and orientations to spring forth. There is a growing body of interpretivist, constructivist, critical, feminist, and minority perspectives today. Public choice/market (Vincent Ostrom, Gordon Tullock, Buchanan) and emergent (Thayer) theories are garnering support. Simon's logical positivism is being challenged an unworkable and outmoded for PA. Chris Argyris, Denhardt, Jurgan Habermas, Oppenheimer, and others have offered additional perspectives to aid PA in the search of a paradigm.
However, in spite of the progress and prospects for a paradigm for PA, I would caution those who thinks PA is close to obtaining one. PA is a long way from resolving the value problems that Dahl first brought up in 1940. Normative issues must be dealt with, especially since PA is composed of practitioners who deal with values and in effect make policy on a daily basis. It is impossible to avoid value judgements.
Even research methods are not value free. Theory must be selected and applied. Choosing variables interjects values since some are rejected while others are allowed to remain in the study. How the variables are operationalized constitutes a value judgement 4 I am reminded of a recent PAR article I read that points out how even multiple regression analysis has problems since the richness and variety of variables are smoothed out or relegated to the mean.
Other problems can be identified as well. What is unique to PA? Does PA have any tools of its own other than perhaps the case study (see Golembiewski and Van Riper for more on this)? Along this notion, a recent PAR article questions whether PA is a field of growing relative ignorance. There is no unified theory of even organization theory or budgeting, let alone one for the entire discipline of PA (see Aaron Wildavsky, Alan Schick, Irene Rubin, etc. for discussion of such theories). Apart from attempts in the area of general systems theory (see Ledwig von Bertalanffy, Katz and Kahn, and others), has there been anything even close to uniting these areas?
Perhaps even more disappointing, there is little agreement even on what constitutes the "big questions" of PA (see Behn [PAR 1995] and responses by Neumann [1996] and Kirklin [1996] for examples). The "wicked problems" talked about by Harmon and Mayer in their book prevail today. Indeed, to borrow from the poet Robert Frost, there is miles to go before we sleep as a discipline on this issue.
Finally, to build a case for which of these four questions we should devote our time and attention to in the future, I will answer in light of the discussion in Part II. I feel that while it is noble to attempt and does increase the richness of the field to deal with paradigmatic development, PA scholars and practitioners nevertheless should devote most of their future time and attention on balancing the conflicting values of efficiency and representativeness. Lest we despair, Kuhn did say that research and theory building can occur in the absence of a paradigm.
There is a natural tension between the values of efficiency and representativeness. The classical scholars knew they were mutually exclusive and therefore often argued that they should be separated. We know they cannot be separated. Evidence abounds in support of this impossibility. Compare Michael Lipsky (The Street-Level Bureaucrat, 1980s) and David Mechanic (1960s) and the power of lower level participants. Policy is made when administrators act. Administrators act even on the lowest level when they make decisions. Others over the years have been aware of this occurrence from Herbert Kaufman to Denhardt, from Robert Merton in 1940 to Vincent Ostrom in the late 1980s.
I do not believe PA can ever truly become a science. I believe Dahl's classic argument and suggestions will stand for ages to come and will never be replaced with a "normative scientific" solution. Such terms used together are oxymoron, I feel. Instead, I feel that PA should be proud of the fact that is does deal with values, that it is normative, and it does work with unscientific social notions such as social equity and democracy. I feel Lynch et al.'s 1997 article in JPART about the secularization of PA hits this nail on the head. The authors argue that PA should not even be afraid to explore the "religious truths" and writings of Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam for more insight in dealing with the problems of PA and as a source of values.
I feel that PA should get over its inferiority complex (as I see things) and proclaim victory. (After all, it is public administrators who fund or regulate most of the "hard sciences.") Humans thoughts and feelings are difficult and perhaps impossible to fully quantify, they are not rational (instead they are bounded or limited in Simon's sense at best and probably follow Lindblom's incremental processes anyway), and seldom allow generalizations that can easily cross over cultural boundaries.
Since a pure science is out of reach for PA, at least in the positivistic tradition, I feel that PA should concentrate on what it can do best. That is act as broker for the tension between efficiency and representativeness. PA works in this context and deals with such social forces in an uncertain environment. Positivistic science does not work well in such a context. PA currently represents the best tool we have for dealing with such situations, I feel.5
Therefore, I see great value in publications like that of Ronald Moe, "Exploring the Limits of Privatization" (1980s PAR), in which he pragmatically looks at American policy and administration and offers insight. I feel that even bureaucracy, in spite of its limits, has virtues (see Moe's [different Moe] recent PAR article "Extolling the Virtues of Bureaucracy") especially in providing stability and institutionalized democracy and opportunity (especially for women and minorities).
Perhaps Robert Durant is on track with his July 1998 Administration and Society article about the 3 Ds for the administrative state: "downsizing, defunding, and devolution." Durant sees these options as the primary ones that American government is faced with given the political options currently in vogue. He argues that the minimalists (basically public choice, laissez faire classic liberals) and the positivists (social neo-liberals) are pushing government toward a reduced, "lean and mean" system. Minimalists do it to reduce the size of government while positivists do it to become more efficient so government can become more effective and responsive to its customers (compare with the Reinventing Government article cited above by Frederickson).
Perhaps on the 50th anniversary of Dwight Waldo's Administrative State, things look different. However, I feel that are the issues driving American government. The administrative state is essential today as it was when it was founded. Rohr, in tracing its foundations back to the Constitution and the intentions of the founding fathers, provides much needed legitimacy in today's environment of the 3 Ds.
Just as Laswell talked about "who gets what," we see the tension that existed between efficiency and responsiveness in the past will continue as it has from the beginning. Something must be done to provide order to the process. I argue that what better profession is there to broker this tension than PA?
ENDNOTES
1. For example, ancient Egypt, China, and other cultures had extensive and complex administrative systems. Shaffritz and Ott point out that in 1491 B.C., Jethro, the father-in-law of Moses established a hierarchical system for administrative justice among the Hebrews. Shaffritz and Ott also point out that there is a rich heritage of administrative writings found among Muslim scholars from A.D. 700 through the 1500s. Mooney and Reilly remind us that the "principles of administration" are not new, but have been known and used since ancient times.
2. I would argue they are phases or classification systems and not paradigms. Henry says they are sometimes overlapping, but that idea seems inconsistent with Kuhn's "scientific revolution" idea in which the old dies hard and the new one prevails at the expense of the old. Also, the fact that there are values in Henry's "paradigms" seem to me that they would invalidate these notions from being paradigms, if Dahl's argument that science cannot employ values is correct.
3. Van Riper is quick to point out that too much is made of the politics administration dichotomy. Van Riper suggests that Wilson and even Goodnow did not have much influence on the development of PA as a discipline. For example, Wilson is not cited in any major PA literature prior to World War I and only cited rarely (White's textbook is one example) before the 1930s.
4. On an even deeper level, science itself is suspect of not being entirely value-free. Scientists must start somewhere. There is a "leap of faith" required in moving beyond the unknown to a basic assumption that we can know anything about what is real. Is there a reality? How can we know? What is real? These questions, often relegated to the philosophists and metaphysicists, I feel are legitimate on a paradigmatic level in PA.
5. Particularly when it comes to such things as human relations. Scholars like Mary Parker Follett (1926--"power with" as opposed to "power over"), Douglas McGregor (Theory X and Y), Ouchi (Theory Z), Argyris, Kaufman, and Maslow ("A Human Theory of Motivation") are especially pragmatic in this regard.
QUESTION: The field of public administration has been described as a conglomeration of many smaller fields, all stuck together in a single discipline. Within this discipline, there are a number of issues, theories, propositions, and causes, all fighting for recognition or attention. What do you think is the most important issue in the study of public administration today? Make a case for why you think this issue/theory/cause is the most important. Provide examples of how the literature treats (or has treated) this issue. How have ideas about this issue/theory developed over time? What does the future hold for this issue/theory? Explain and support your answer.
TENSION BETWEEN RATIONAL ACTION AND DEMOCRACY
INTRODUCTION
In the United States, public administration, as a field or concept, has a normative underpinning or foundation. The normative foundation is the United States Constitution (1787) and is explained in the Federalist Papers. The writings of Alexander Hamilton and James Madison have the most normative influence on public administration. This normative foundation makes American public administration qualitatively different from public administration practiced in other countries and cultures. In particular, those countries which value a strong role for the central government. Stillman characterized the development of public administration in the United States as reflecting the development of an American notion of "state." Stillman argues that the United States had a "negative state" or no state from its founding until the late 1860's. On the other hand, European countries, such as France, have a long standing tradition of a professional, public administration, as well as valuing a strong state and a similar role for centralized state public administration. Stillman notes that in the European context, "state" is most often the central exercise of authority toward national goals. Kettl (1993) has described Hamilton as the father of administration and Wilson (1887) as the father of public administration. This dates to both Hamilton's contribution to the Federalist Papers and his activities as the Secretary of the Treasury. The Hamiltonian tradition of "energetic, effective" government envisions a strong, central government that is capable of accomplishing its goals.
However, Madison's writings influence the construction of the 1787 United States constitution, showing a continuing concern over the concentration of power within any one area of the central government and a fear of tyranny by the majority. Realistic views of someone familiar with European monarchies and the American revolution. Many of Madison's concerns are similar to those who are concerned with the power of the bureaucracy such as James Q. Wilson (1989) Bureaucracy, Ralph Hummel's (1983) The Bureaucratic Experience, and Max Weber (1922) Bureaucracy.
The tension between the rational action and democracy is contained, in part, in the classical public administration paradigm. While some argue that the classical public administration paradigm no longer exists, it has not yet been replaced by another paradigm that is accepted. According to Kuhn (1970) the rejection of the reigning paradigm is not enough-, its successor must be adopted for Kuhn's scientific revolution to take place. Since no new prevailing paradigm has been adopted (new public administration is not the new paradigm, see below) then aspects of the classical public administration paradigm must then be used to show that tension is created.
Wilson's (1887) early writings on public administration were an extension of his class lectures in public law. It also marked the development of seeds of the reform movement which led to the rise of the Progressive Era which coincided with the rise of public administration. Wilson provided public administration with its fundamental rubric--the separation of politics and administration. Wilson's intention to juxtapose politics and administration as polar opposites is sufficiently unclear as to establish his motive for this construction. Some have argued that it was developed to give credence to those reform efforts to eliminate the spoils mentality of the day. However, as Goodnow and others further developed the explanation of the dichotomy, the more concrete it became.
The historical context of the late 1800's does provide some important clues to the development of the classical public administration paradigm. Reformers were intent on removing the "spoils" system from government such as the Tammany Hall example. The Pendleton Act was intended to use merit to select certain federal employees. Urbanization was occurring in both the United States and in Europe, and the use of reason and science were coming into favor. The faith in reason and in the application of science to human problems ran high; and many accomplishments stood as testimony to such. These forces converged at the time of the development of public administration in the United States.
Along with Wilson, Goodnow, and White's early writings about public administration and the need to separate politics from administration, other developments were taking place. Factories were becoming efficient and Frederick Taylor's scientific management took hold. Scientific management was based on the development of science and reason in an effort to determine the logical application of this approach-- one best way. Production was the role of organizations and the application of scientific method would find the best way for machines to work; people would be applied as resources where machines were inefficient or unworkable.
Management theory then (and now) became committed to the notion of one best way to do most anything, and this "one best way" could be discovered through the application of the appropriate scientific inquiry. Jobs were described and specified, compensation became linked to production, and management knew what was best for the organization--and by extension, the workers. The concept of "one best way" is the seed of the tension existing between rational action and democracy.
The development of a public "Taylorism"and the faith of the era in scientific inquiry led to the development of a rational-comprehensive model of behavior. The development of this "rational- comprehensive" model led to its application in "many smaller fields" that comprise or contribute to the discipline of public administration. This sowing of the seeds of rational-comprehensive behavior led to the growth of threats to democracy, better described as the tension between public administration and democracy. Rational man or action is grounded in the theories of Weber (bureaucracy) and Benthern (economics). The ideal type of bureaucracy is described as rational, legal, formalistic, impersonal, based on a division of labor, evaluation, and similar "scientific approaches." While Weber was concerned about the individual becoming an impersonal "cog' in a bureaucratic organization, Taylorism embraced it. Bentham's utility theory is grounded in the notion that rational economic man will seek to maximize benefits, while minimizing the costs. These values are reflected in Taylorism. and much of public administration up until World War II.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ISSUE
During the first years of this century the application of rational administrative principles was clearly the reigning paradigm in public administration. Frederick Cleveland's "budget idea" was based on a responsible executive proposing a budget for approval, and once approved being accountable for its executing it. In the area of budgeting at the municipal level or the federal level el, a responsible execution. It was a reform prescription intended to move the President directly into an active role of the federal budget process and ultimately led to the adoption of the federal budget act of 192 1.
Louis White (1926) wrote the first public administration textbook, while Frank Goodnow spent most of the first twenty years of this century fleshing out the doctrine of separation of politics and administration. Goodnow firmly had his roots in the field of political science as the first President of APSA, while public administration was one of the five fields of political science. This closely held alliance with political science was to last until the dawn of the behavioral approach to social science after World War 11.
In the area of organization and management theory the rational approach also reigned, and this era culminated in the Brownlow Commission of 1937. The application of rational principles of organization such as division of labor, specialization, became a complete approach to public administration. After all, public administration was seen as a way to improve government effectiveness. Gulick's acronym POSDSCORB (planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting, and budgeting) became the shorthand guide to the era.
The leaders of the field such as Brownlow (father of the city management form of government), Merriam (scientific management), and Gulick (Notes on the Theory of Organization) all contributed to the report of the Brownlow Commission.
This "high water" mark of public administration found it dominating the American Political Science Association leadership, training professionals for government service, and its leaders involved in the highest councils of American government. The American Society for Public Administration was born just before World War H. Concerns about democracy and the limits of public, administration began near this time. Appleby (1945) argued in the Big Democracy that the difference between government and all other social action was as great as the difference between all other remaining forms of social action. Dahl raised concerns about the difficulty of public administration becoming a science due to its normative underpinnings. V.0. Key's famous budgeting question about the actual decision to allocate dollars to activity A over activity B has been described, fundamentally, a normative question.
V. 0. Key (1940) and Allen Schick (1995) both believe that budgeting is political--in some sense. Claiming and allocating or conserving resources is normative. Budget research addresses the rational tension question in two major ways: process issues and technocrat issues. The development of sophisticated budgeting techniques beginning with the Cleveland's "responsible executive" implies the application of a rational technique--a budget plan. Denhardt (1992) describes this period of public administration as providing "honest government in the public interest."
However, the application of scientific method and rational action to budgeting led to the rise of budgeting systems: program budgeting, PERT, PPBS, ZZB, and techniques surrounding strategic planning and management. These systems operated outside the realm of representative government and within the control of the professional staff and administrators. Gosling studied the staffing of state budget offices to determine if the effect of background and education impacted the operation of such offices. In traditional "financial management" budget offices, the educational background was typically less education, as well as education in accounting fields. In those budget offices actively involved in policy, the educational level included more graduate degrees and a broader educational background (I. E. Master's degree in public administration). As early as the 1920's, Buck, saw the role of a strong budget office in the budget process. I in many instances the additional information gained by these technical processes has served both society and democratic purposes, I. E. program budgeting was widely regarded as being critical to the success of the mobilization of the federal government and the national economy during World War II.
On the other hand, the usefulness of zero based budgeting as described by Lauth in Georgia and Phyrr at the federal level leaves the reader wondering if it was worth all of the effort to implement. In practice, many of the reasons supporting an incremental approach existed in the use of ZZB. The initial decision package contained too much (or little--depending on your view) information, it required too much time (thousands of decision packages), and it resulted in a process that was both driven by the margin and serial in nature.
McNamara's introduction of PPBS in the Department of Defense led to its subsequent adoption government-wide. It attempted to introduce long-range planning into the policy and budget decisions of the DOD in much the same way he had used it at Ford Motor Company. Schick (1975) says it did a number of things well--it included settled areas of conflict such as national obligations, treaties, and the continuation of existing programs. It- did not react to short time tables such as those created by the decision of the Congress.
Another budgeting issue involving the application of rational action the 1974 Budget and Impoundment Act that established a budgeting system on the congress which set time tables for comprehensive action. Rubin, Schick, Wildavsky, and Caiden have all described the 1974 act as a dividing line, for "before and after." In their collective view, the 1974 act has not (did not) live up to its expectations; and, in fact, depending on how you measure budget outcome, 1. E. growing structural deficits and the adoption of an automatic decision structure requiring the federal government to expend budget resources in an unknown amount(entitlement programs), the 1974 act (and its successors in kind such as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, the Budget Enforcement Act, etc) have failed.
The 1974 act was in part, in response to Nixon's efforts to "impound" appropriated funds to prevent them from being spent. However, in reality it was the adoption of an executive centered, centralized budgeting process on an institution that was designed to be decentralized. Reagan and Clinton used the process against the Congress to accomplish macro-budgeting goals, while its use by the Congress to significantly influence the executive is mixed at best. Rubin (1996) has shown that even the Republican- dominated 104th Congress still allowed President Clinton 65% of his spending goals.
Perhaps the best indictment of the application of rational-comprehensive technique in budgeting (found also in public policy) is contained in Lindbloom's theory of "disjointed incrementalism." Building on Simon's "bounded rationality" and factoring in other the limited availability of resources such as time, institutional research capability, and interest of the involved decision-makers, Lindbloom's theories filled a void in budgeting theory until the 1960's.
The notion that decision-making is reactive to problems brought forth by the public, that limited options are considered, that officials have limited interest, and staff resources can only do so much with a given issue made this a popular theory. Aaron Wildvasky applied this theory to budgeting; although it has fallen out of favor it still has explanatory power. Perhaps its power is not diminished, particularly during times of complex change.
The criticism of scientific management and rational action in organizations began early in the classical era with diverse writings such as Mary Parker Follett (1926) "On Giving Orders," the writings of Chester Bamard in The Role of the Executive, and the research findings of Elton Mayo's Hawthone Works experiments in Chicago revealed that workers react to observation and that workers sometimes respond in a group support the beginnings of the erosion of classical rationalism.
The consideration of the individual within the organization began a line of research into human motivation that has not yet ended. In fact Charles Perrow (1989) reminds us that over the past decades it is easier to identify what does not work, as opposed to what does work in organizations. This period saw the individual be recognized as a unit of analysis within organizational behavior.
Herbert Simon's path breaking work in decision theory which led to the rise of public management and administrative science, also identifies the idea of "bounded rationality." If rationality is bounded by the limits of the individual then rationality itself is limited. These individual limits on what an individual may know and be capable of understanding is still actively debated today. Hummel (1991) argues that the stories that managers tell should be considered as valid as science.
A number of writers, then devoted themselves to understanding the individual and the group within the organization. Motivation theorists such as Maslow's (1946) hierarchy of needs, MacGregor's (1955) Theory X and Theory Y, Herzberg (1966) Hygiene-Motivators, Vroom's Expectancy Theory, Path-Goal theory, and Vroom-Yetton's contingency theory all focus on the individual. Granted, in some instances the theoretical underpinnings are based on rational analysis and the contributions of the line of studies away from leadership traits toward skills and situations have helped such analyses.
However, must of this work has culminated in contingency theory which requires a good "fit" or understanding with environmental issues. Such a fit with the environment is not rational. It requires the application of rational analytical techniques to evaluate the environment, but the environment--in and of itself--is not rational. If the environment is not rational, then the range of rational responses to it is significantly limited. This implies that the choice of all options are denied to the decision-maker and, as such, requires a "qualitative" decision about what is most likely to work in the given circumstances.
This is compounded by Hersey-Blanchard's situational leadership model that describes the leader function as responding to the environment in two distinct ways: the situational variables affect the leaders and the organization. The effect of these variables must become a part of the variables identified in the decision-calculus of the leader and the organization. it further implies that the leader, if choosing to be effective within the given situation, must be willing to ignore or discard information available to them from their analytical sources and limit their choice of alternatives based on environmental fit.
By the early 1960's policy analysis began to emerge as a field. Policy analysis is grounded in utility theory, rationality, and employs Pareto optimality. According to Robertson and Judd, the application of policy analysis itself is designed to overcome the failures of the political system (as a market ) to provide goods fairly to all segments of society. Jenkins-Smith identifies public policy analysis as a threat to democracy within the title of his book.
Policy analysis, according to Dye, Jenkins-Smith, and Robertson-Judd, has discrete steps. These steps essentially are: problem identification, goal articulation, alternative development, adoption, implementation, and evaluation. The policy analyst is required to "go where the analysis takes them" much in the same way a scientific research is conducted.
Jenkins-Smith is most articulate in describing how policy analysis, an inherently rational action, threatens democracy: The policy analysts work may be counter to representative government. The use of technology may be counter to representative government. The analysts assumptions are normative--at some level. The analysis may cloud this normative bias in a thicket of numbers. Analysis is available to those who can afford it to affect the political process.
Each of these five reasons are counter to the notion of representative democracy and the idea that the articulation of public sentiment is found through the work of the elected representatives.
SPECIFICALLY
The limits of rational action within a democracy has been a concern since the beginning of the republic. The Madisonian competition of ideas is found in Federalist Ten, and provides for a remedy for the tyranny of the majority. This early concern was an intentional decision as a part of a broader political theory. This intentional constitutional calculus was designed to prevent any branch of government--the executive, the legislative (even the design of the upper and lower house), and the judiciary--from gaining the upper hand. By providing multiple veto points for action, it is clear that the intention was to make change and policy slowly.
At the dawn of New Public Administration in the late 1960's a concern arose over social equity. The notion that a "social equity" exists requires a normative value as a beginning point. Voices of this era began to focus on problems with the current status of public administration; and, indirectly, on society itself George Frederickson (1969) likened good public policy to the Judeo-Christian ethic.
The extension of pluralism (Federalist Ten principle) to the bureaucracy was described by Krislov (1974) as a prescription to the failure of the bureaucracy to be representative. In fact, for bureaucratic decisions to be made with any validity (within our normative tradition) all aspects of society must be represented within the bureaucracy. This allows for their points of view to be actively debated and their positions heard.
Dwight Waldo (19 7 1) described the period surrounding the development of new public administration as a time of turbulence. It appears clear looking back with twenty-five years of hind sight that it may have been a normative revolution. I posit this argument based on this fundamental argument. If social equity was demanded to meet the needs of the time, then the public outputs of government (post World War 11 public administration) were inadequate to meet the needs of the public. According to Stillman by the time of the second Minnebrook Conference very few of the same topics were being discussed, and certainly without the fervor.
It may have other dimensions, too. Frederickson (1989) describes the need for the "recovery of civism" as a prescription to restore confidence in government' His civism implies a return to civics with the community at the forefront, an involved and active citizenry, and government responding to these model citizens. This perhaps is the irony, public administration after focusing on organizations and management, institutional arrangements, policy development and implementation, a representative bureaucracy returns to a focus on citizens.
At the same time, one of the premier scholars of bureaucracy, James Q. Wilson, issued his work of the same title. While those studying bureaucracy has remained an eclectic group of scholars, Wilson offers new food for the current debate, even if it is a reminder of what we may already know. First, Wilson argues persuasively that we really have no way of knowing if bureaucracies are effective. This is due to our efforts to apply norms most suitable for the private sector--economy and efficiency (rational action?)--to other goals of society as articulated through government. These other goals might include representativeness, fair competition to do business with the government, public access to meetings and records, mandated public involvement through hearings and notices, and other uniquely American values.
These values, particularly when combined with his concerns about limiting the ability of bureaucracies to act "independently" while remaining under "public control," are Madisonian in origin. In essence it is an effort to maintain the necessary balance of multiple vetoes and points of approval required before public policy is changed. Again, fear that the rule of the majority may trample minority rights.
Other current writers on bureaucracy, as well as much of the reinventing government literature ignores the notion of democratic administration. Barzelay (1993) in Breaking Through Bureaucracy, Denhardt (1992), and Gabler (1989) in Reinventing Government all follow fairly common themes which appear to have root in Cleveland's "responsible executive." However, they have their foundation in the Hamiltonian strain of constitutional thought, and potentially undermine the built-in protections of the American constitution. Barzelay critiques bureaucracy as creating the illusion that it is effective and responsive, but it actually has misguided management and misplaced accountability--in effect it is weak. This is exactly what the Madisonian normative perspective would hope for bureaucracy.
Matthews (1991) reporting the results of a study conducted by the Kettering Foundation found that citizen's were not apathetic, but disgusted. They were disgusted with the failure of government to provide results to even the most obvious problems facing society. In fact, the findings did not show too much in the way of disagreement with the response of government, but its lack of response.
I suggest that Ostrom's Intellectual Crisis in Public Administration (1973) is the premier voice of the tension between rational action and democracy. Ostrom constructs a concept, democratic administration, that embodies many of the concerns I have about rational action. I suspect that the results of the Kettering study, at least from this viewpoint, are found in the failure of rational action--budgeting techniques, policy outcomes, improvement in decision making, and the continued use of bureaucratic organization in spite of what has become a national effort to "reinvent" government. Democratic administration focuses on a prescription for some of these problems of modem government.
Democratic administration finds its roots in the existing constitutional arrangement of the United States. Stillman tells us that the United States lagged behind European countries in the development of public administration due to the uniquely American view of the state. European states early on developed a highly centralized bureaucracy that served national goals. In Stillman's view, the United States did not develop this "state" view (presented with an apparent underlying normative opinion this state view was appropriate), until the late nineteenth century. I would argue that the founders had a very distinct view of the role of the American state and intended to create three separate, but equal branches; while leaving substantial power to its constituent states. This deliberate design of the framers was to preserve liberty.
It seems important to consider the tension between rational action and democracy with the normative foundation of the framers of the United States constitution. Public administration, particularly the classical paradigm, was and is normative. Wilson appears to draw more from the Hamiltonian influences within the United States constitution, than the Madisonian. Perhaps it is time to draw solutions from the federal constitution's Madisonian normative influences; and, in effect," breathe with both lungs."
FUTURE OF THE ISSUE
I believe that the recovery of Madisonian principles and the proper restraint of rational action is fundamental if we are to preserve representative government and make democracy fulfill its potential in the next century. The increase of rational action in government does not appear to have improved government outcomes, and the complexity of these systems needs further study.
As pointed out by Matthews, the public is disgusted. Today's intractability of public issues may be, in part, due to an over reliance on rational action and technique, and too little faith in democratically elected representatives. The development of too many alternatives, too much process, too many professional fora for debate, and too many studies full of numbers is blocking the decision-making ability of those elected and numbing the minds of the public.
Theodore Lowi (1969) in the End of Liberalism and the Threat to Republican Government (1992) strongly criticizes liberal (in the classical sense) government. While he would not necessarily approve of his proposals to be applied in this sense, they have some merit at least in focusing our minds on new solutions.
His solutions are radical within certain contexts, but the idea of a juridical democracy: return decision-making to the states, limited duration for law, and return to a rule of law all have a positive effect on the status quo. Lowi's return to a rule of law limits administrative rule-making and executive decision- making by requiring clear delegation of legislative authority to the executive branch. Clearly defined decisions by the legislative branch will place the locus of authority in the hands of the people's representatives. If this were true, then the public would know exactly who and when the decision was made.
The idea that the states should play a greater role has come to pass with welfare reform in 1996. The federal government has agreed (in this limited arena) that experimentation is good and that the United States can afford variations across each state in this policy arena. This limited instance of Lowi's solution restores, to some degree, the framers original vision of the role of the states within the federal constitutional framework. In fact, current debate about the restoration of the 10th amendment is a call to arms for those believing in state's rights. While in the south state's rights smack of racism (rightly so, due to our construction of this term) it means control over land in the west and, perhaps, environmental issues in the northeast.Future study will be about the appropriate placement of rational or professional competence in the realm of American government. One additional outcome, an outcome that has been important since the beginning of the discipline of public administration, is the training of government employees. Perhaps it is time to provide an equal exposure to Madisonian as well as Hamiltionian principles of administration-- with equal enthusiasm.
At the time of the framing of the constitution, those involved had no real appreciation for the possibility of the development of the administrative state. It appeared sufficient to create three equal branches of government, each without the ability to unilaterally dominate the other. The rise of bureaucratic organizations coinciding with the industrial era disturbed the normative "applecart" of the American federal system.
At the time of the early development of public administration, a normative foundation for all things scientific and rational held sway. It appeared that a scientific, rational approach would allow for the development of the one best way or answer to any question. No limits were placed on the promise of science. We found we were wrong.
First, we found that large-scale industrial monopolies were "bad" in a normative sense for our economy and their size and scope should be reduced and broken up. It would only occur to us long after we had applied similar principles as a dramatic (meaning tremendous change in the role of the national government) solution to the economic problems of the 1930's that large-scale government approaches were also "bad" in a normative sense for government.
The future will be marked with an effort 1) find the appropriate use for, and 2) how to bring these bureaucracies and their rational, professional competence under public control. This is an issue that extends beyond the realm of those who have continued to study institutions and bureaucracy, itself It will evolve all of public administration and all of its fields.
Elected representatives have joined the battle; but, perhaps, without the significant efforts of public administration to improve the situation. This is due, in large part, to the nature of the political debate involved; as well as a concern over "neutral competence.
Nixon began with an effort to either eliminate Great Society programs such as the Office of Economic Opportunity or through the impoundment of budgeted funds, while Reagan employed a macro- budgetary approach to decouple spending decisions from economic policy to impose change on the bureaucracy--even if it meant ballooning deficits as the result. Reagan also denied resources to troublesome bureaucracies such as the Environmental Protection Agency in an effort to "starve" them into submission.
The Clinton Presidency could be a watershed in the future of taming the bureaucracy. The
battles over budget policy and the efforts of the Republican Congress to hold the entire federal budget "hostage" over policy disagreements seems to have backfired as a tool in this debate. Again, the use of the budget process by the Congress requires them to adopt strategies of a more centralized, cogent executive (Contract with America).
This approach denies the strengths of the legislative institution: slow, deliberative process; expertise decentralized throughout the system of committees and subcommittees; and, the "grinding of executive proposals" through the process. It is impossible for the myriad of interests contained in a legislative body to hold to what is essentially an executive point of view-, for instance, the Republican freshman in Congress from Oak Ridge, Tennessee broke with the leadership and voted in the best interests of his district--continued federal funding of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. I expect the government shutdowns of the 104th Congress will be one of the last attempts of the legislative branch to act in an "executive" manner.
Essentially, the next step is to reframe the issue of rational action within a democracy. This leads to a natural study of the uses, problems, and limits of rational action. It requires a revisiting of other substantive areas of public administration. Since we are reframing, then the questions must change as we visit these areas; instead of "How do we improve these techniques?" the question might become, "Within the limits of our normative tradition, how do we best use these rational action techniques and preserve the authority of the duly elected representatives of the people.
It is time for public administration to recover one of its founding tenets--an effort to improve government. Perhaps Schick (1975) was right to, be concerned about the future of public administration divorced entirely from political Science and Kaufinan's (1990) concern over the estrangement of public administration from political science it real. However, some accommodation between these two distinct disciplines is necessary to organize and mobilize the tools necessary to accomplish what needs to be done.
The original approach and concerns of the public administration discipline remains true today, but the same enthusiasm for their application does not. The Progressive Era has ended and public administration is no longer the rational "tool" of the reformers anymore. In fact, government employees have become the focus of the ire of the public (egged on of course by the campaigns of elected officials). Our quest must be to find out why and find our way back to the center of the American government experience.
It may even be time to discard the rational action rubric of social science. While the reductionist approach to rational action and scientific inquiry is firmly ingrained in the art, processes, and science of public administration, it does not have to be so. An emerging construct, complexity and chaos, holds promise for our understanding of public administration. It also provides a place for rational action, while allowing for other types of action.
Complexity theory believes that the very focus of anything complex' requires a metaanalytic viewpoint, or the opposite of the reductionist approach. (Coveneny and Highfield, 1994) Complexity theory grows from the work of Nobel prize winner Isabel Prigoinne. Prigoinne and Stengers are chemists who have studied disapative structures (pluralists rejoice!) which are open systems.
These opens systems attempt to maintain equilibrium, but are marked by much activity at the edge of equilibrium--defined by Glieck (1991)-- as the range between order and chaos. These open systems evolve in response to their environment (contingency theory) and may reach what Prigioone and Stengers described as a bifurcation point. At the bifurcation point the system may dissolve into chaos or reorganize itself into a more highly organized structure. In open systems chemistry no way exists to predict the direction of the change in advance of the change.
Another aspect these systems-what researcher (Arrow, Bak, et. al. at the Santa Fe Institute-call complex adaptive systems. A complex adaptive system is one that exists with time moving forward from a past that is irreversible and is complex-as opposed to complicated. These systems are self-organized and Bak (1992) has identified "self-organizing criticality" where the same pathway to change exists and is used by both large and small changes. Douglas Keil (1994 review in PAR 1996) has described these non-average events as probing the fundamental stability of the structure. Keil has developed the use of complexity theory in public management and organization.
This theory holds promise. It has the potential to better explain why rational action as well as "irrational action" causes change in an organization environment. It better explains how technique as well as situational and environmental circumstances can effect the outcome of a government decision. It provides a means to focus on the outcome of chaos in systems, and it provides a model to understand the inherent complexities built into the normative foundation of American political experience.
QUESTION: Governmental budget decision making involves agencies, executives, and legislatures. The impact of each of these actors depends on the "rules of the game," both formal requirements and informal relationships. At the same time, budget decision making involves tensions between professional administration and politics. Describe the tension between politics and professional administration and develop two budget decision making models that involve the interplay between these three budget actors: one model that stresses politics over professional administration and one model that stresses professional administration over politics.
As in the first day's test question, I will follow a similar format of interpreting and narrowing the question and outlining my response. I will attempt to justify my answers today, when possible, using new material. In this regard, I am accepting my thoughts and references from the first day as a base from which to build upon today so there will (hopefully) not be a great deal of overlap and repetition. This format will be employed for both questions today.
As I interpret this question, it is asking that I specifically to do the following two things: (1) discuss the tension between politics and professional administration in relation to budgeting and (2) develop or describe two decision making models of budgeting that capture the essence of the interplay between agencies, executives, and legislatures. The second part of this question is split two ways: one model must emphasize or attempt to empower politics over professional administration and one model must do the opposite.
What is a budget? Around 1915, Cleveland wrote that a budget is a document that allocates public resources in a manner consistent with the decisions made by executive and legislative actors involved in a political process. In effect, even though politics determines who gets what, the budget is a tool for allocating sufficient resources to institutionalize these political choices. Therefore, a budget is a political document. This viewpoint represents a common theme throughout the literature (see Irene Rubin, Aaron Wildavsky, Edward Clynch, Glenn Abney, and Lauth for example).
Even before V.O. Key's famous lament in 1940 (PAR) over the lack of a budgetary theory, PA scholars have been searching for ways to describe and explain the political process of budgeting. The political process makes explicit the tension between politics and professional administration in budgeting. By design, the American system of government is fragmented. There are many players and multiple access points (see The Federalist Papers) within the system. Power is diffused across the government (and even across governments; i.e. federalism), yet it is concentrated enough to be collected into semi-balanced groups who are constitutionally pitted one against the other (checks and balances). This is politics American style. It is not efficient. It is slow. It is cumbersome. Decisions that are made are usually the result of bargaining and "log rolling" agreement. Partisan differences abound and are sometimes harsh.
Contrast this with the ideals of professional administration. We must, I feel, look at this issue contextually, particularly in reference to time. Go back to the classic public administration theorists for examples of what professional administration is or at least ought to be (normative statements abounded then even though the goal was promoting "scientific" administration or management). Woodrow Wilson and Frank Goodnow said professional administration should be separate from politics. The good government movement latched onto this notion as well. The "principles" of administration (Luther Gulick et al.) and scientific techniques (Henri Fayol, Frederick Taylor et al.) were "discovered" to strip politics away from professional administration. The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 attempted to streamline the budgetary process. The Brownlow Commission, made up of Brownlow, Merriam, and Gulick, submitted a detailed plan for reforming and enhancing the executive branch of government and making professional administration work. I would argue that many in PA today are still searching for this professional administration "fountain of youth." Look no further than the Reinventing Government Movement of the 1990s and read some of its claims.
From Robert Dahl to Dwight Waldo to Vincent Ostrom and Robert Durant (see first day's answer for more on these scholars), we see that values cannot be separated from administration. Values compete with positivistic science. The same is true in budgeting since a budget is a value-laden, normative, political document. Aaron Wildavsky talked about the need for a normative theory of budgeting, for example. The tension between politics and professional administration will not go away. Again, budgeting simply makes explicit this tension since a budget is a political document that funds government policy.1
The values of efficiency and responsiveness or accountability are extremes along a continuum. The closer one approaches one of these variables, the further one is removed from the other. Verne Lewis (1952, PAR) was aware of this tension or value dichotomy in budgeting as he helped PA move toward a budgeting theory.
As I see things, there are two basic ways to view the decision making process of government in reference to budgeting. One is the classic "bottom-up" model and the other is the "top-down" model that gained so much support during the reform era of the early part of this century through the work of President Taft, W. F. Willoughby, Cleveland, and many others. While there are many procedures or variations within each model (such as performance budgeting or Zero Base Budgeting), I feel there are only two basic models.
I will start with a description of the bottom-up model. The bottom-up model has been around since the beginning of the American Republic. Alexander Hamilton as Treasurer employed a type of bottom-up approach for budgeting in the 1780s. Irene Rubin writes that prior to the 1960s, most of the states have used a bottom-up model in which the agencies made budget requests and reported directly to the legislature. This is still the basic practice in states like (especially) South Carolina, Texas, and Mississippi (Clynch and Lauth).
In bottom-up states and local governments, the line-item type of budget has often been employed. This budget format lists every item on its own line and gives the legislature a great deal of control over individual appropriations since they can add or strike out provisions at will. There is no need on behalf of the agency to justify or report performance measures. The legislature runs the process. The executive is essentially left out of the process and is reduced to responding at best.
Rubin talks about the time prior to the 1921 budgetary reform in the United States. The budgetary process was highly fragmented with Congress taking budget requests directly from the agencies. There were no unified budget numbers and multiple appropriations throughout the year were the norm. Power was fragmented among the congressional players, the president was left largely out of the process, and the process was disjointed. Majoritarian notions of representativeness (see Clynch, Wildavsky, and Lauth)2 were ignored since congress and not the president controlled the purse strings.
Under bottom-up notions of budgeting, value is placed on fragmenting power and multiple access points and players in the process. This aspect of democracy suggests that the lower levels are closer to the "grass roots" and so should be responsible for directing the purse strings. As it works out, incremental processes seem to prevail in such an environment so as to preserve one's turf (budget base), protect "sunk costs," and save bargaining time (see Wildavsky and Question Four for a detailed discussion of incrementalism).
As the good government movement took hold, my other model-- the top-down model-- began to become a reality in many governments. As stated above, it was largely reform-motivated. The means of securing a top-down approach was through executive budgeting. Here, the president or governor was empowered to receive the budget requests directly from the agencies. Congress and state legislatures adopting this process were reduced to budget responders taking their cues from the executive.
The motive for much of this reform was to improve efficiency and reduce corruption and waste. The efficiency notion was strong as the movement restructured executive branches to empower them and their agencies (especially at the federal level). The values of control and rationalization were sought after. Various budgetary schemes were employed to inject rationality into the system. On the federal level, the old line-item method gave way to performance budgeting and program budgeting. In the 1960s, these methods were essentially combined into what became known as planning-programing budgeting or PPB (Gosling sometimes calls it planning programming budgeting system or PPBS).
Allen Schick wrote extensively about PPB. PPB was originally developed for the Department of Defense. It allows the budget reviewer to learn more about how the program or agency is performing (by submitting quantitative measures demonstrating effectiveness and efficiency) or what the government plans to do with additional funds (by submitting mission statements, for example). Lyndon Johnson adapted it to the federal government in the 1960s. It probably represents the greatest attempt to infuse the budgeting process with rationality. It proved largely unworkable.
In 1971, Abney and Lauth tell us that then Governor Jimmy Carter of Georgia read an article in Harvard Business Review that explained a new budgeting concept developed at Texas Instruments. It was called zero base budgeting or ZBB and functioned by having the agencies submit budget alternatives with different funding levels (for example 60%, 80%, 100%, and 110% of the base [rarely ever went to zero in reality]). Governor Carter liked it and implemented it in Georgia soon afterwards. 3 Carter was elected president in 1976 and became president in 1977 and implemented ZBB for the federal government. It failed to make the budgetary process significantly more efficient or rational at the federal level just as it failed to at other levels. Incrementalism ruled the day, it seemed.
Move into the 1980s. Many state governments had tried ZBB too and began to look for other alternatives as fiscal stress became more common. Recission and cutback management became inevitable around the nation as governments were asked to do more with less ("get more bang for the buck"), especially since they were forced to abide by statutory-mandated or constitutionally-required balanced budgets. According to Irene Rubin, many moved from ZBB to target base budgeting. (Rubin said target base budgeting is basically ZBB without all the work.)
Under target base budgeting, essentially two budgets are submitted to the executive. One contains the current level of services consistent with last year's base (perhaps adjusted for inflation) or the target spending level allowed by the executive. The other suggests alternatives above the base that allow for expanded or enhanced service provision. The budget reviewers choose from those alternatives in both budgets. It allows agencies to prioritize their spending and orchestrate their own cuts somewhat when cuts are required.
While we can see that budgeting has changed over this century, it still seems to follow the two main approaches of bottom-up or top-down. It is either executive centered or legislative centered. However, modifications do exist within these budget types. For example, Katherine Willoughby and her co-author published (Jan/Feb 1998 PAR), their survey of the 50 states and found that 47 of them use some form of performance budgeting today. While most may suggest that performance measures are being used, Clynch points out that in Mississippi where performance measures are supposedly used, the process resembles incrementalism more than any other system.
The reform movement shifted much of the power focus and budgetary emphasis to the executives and away from the Congress or state legislatures. However, has this new balance of power remained static? No, according to two researchers. Glenn Abney and Lauth report (Sep/Oct 1998 PAR) that in the states, legislatures are working to regain their lost power. The process is not a zero sum game, Abney and Lauth conclude. Legislatures are becoming more partisan which shifts power structures and can weaken gubernatorial power. Furthermore, in the states, the governor has not often been afforded the same safeguards to power as the president in the budgetary process and gubernatorial power tends to be eroding over time. Legislatures are taking advantage of this trend resulting in a relative decline in the power of governors across the nation.
To sum things up, I think David Stockman got it right in his book (mid 1980s) about the failure of the Reagan Revolution to effect dramatic change: politics rules the day, not rational thinking. Whether the attempt is made to empower politics or to empower professional administration, politics ultimately triumphs, it seems. Couple this with Niskanan's research that suggests that agency heads will attempt to maximize their discretionary budget, and I predict that the tension between politics and professional administration in budgeting is far, far from over.
ENDNOTES
1. Thomas Dye (1995) suggests that public policy is whatever government chooses to do or not to do. As such, what does not appear in the budget also makes explicit what policy priorities are being employed in the process at that time.
2. This notion suggests that the only individual who is elected by all the voters-- the president-- should be the one allowed to exert the greatest influence on dividing up the public's resources.
3. However, in spite of ZBB's application to Georgia, Abney and Lauth tell us than Georgia's budgeting process still resembles incrementalism more than any other process.
QUESTION: Assess the validity of the following statement: While governments have tried rational decision making systems, and while scholars posit various alternative explanations, incrementalism remains the best explanation of public policy decisions.
As I interpret this question, it simply asks that I defend the notion that, in spite of determined attempts to impose rationality on the system, incrementalism is the most successful or accurate explanation or model of the public policy decision making process.
Ira Sharkansky, in Frank Marini's book (1971) about the Minnowbrook Perspective, points out the importance of policy in PA. While there are a number of explanations for public policy decisions, the incremental model remains the model of choice for many scholars. From Wildavsky's application of it in budgeting to Allison's allusions to it in Essence of a Decision, it has been a vigorous and robust model for understanding and explaining the decision making process. It stands in direct contrast to the rational model. I feel that in order to more fully understand the incremental model, a discussion of the rational model is in order.
Elements of the rational model are often associated with Herbert Simon and his discussions of rational decision making in Administrative Behavior (late 1940s). We could move on to 1959 when Charles Lindblom published his PAR article entitled "The Science of Muddling Through." In this article, Lindblom articulated the rational model (he called it the rational-comprehensive model) and offered the incremental model as a more viable alternative.
Lindblom described the rational model (root method) as one in which a rigorous process is followed in making a decision. First the problem is clearly identified and defined. Then all alternatives/options (means) for dealing with it are articulated. These alternatives and their consequences or outcomes (ends) are rigorously analyzed by means of cost-benefit analysis or some other detailed method. Finally, the single best alternative is chosen and implemented. It is the one alternative that maximizes the values desired. After implementation, evaluation occurs to ensure that what is desired is truly occurring. The process repeats itself.
Even before Lindblom, Simon pointed out that the rational model has limitations. People are not always rational. People cannot evaluate all alternatives. People do not have perfect information to evaluate means and ends. In other words, while the model may suggest a valuable process, humans are limited or bounded in their rationality or their ability to be rational. True rationality demands an all- knowing aspect of existence that can only be likened to that of God. People are incapable of rationality as defined by Simon.
While Simon pointed out that the rational model has value in its pursuit of rational goals, its weaknesses severely detract from its ability to describe decision making, according to others like Lindblom. This understanding paved the way for Lindblom to offer incrementalism as an alternative.
As described by Lindblom, incrementalism is a process of "successive limited comparison" (branch method). Instead of evaluating everything all over again, decision makers accept a set of "givens" and go from there. [In budgeting, Wildavsky calls this the budget base.] These "givens" may represent past decisions or brokered agreements between competing interests. It is far easier to accept them and simply evaluate the change at the margin from these "givens." Thus, only the increment of change is evaluated. We can once again bring Simon into the picture. People evaluate the increment until they find something that works, that satisfies or suffices. Simon calls this "satisficing" since the search is not for the single best option, but for one that works and can be agreed upon.
The strength of this model can perhaps be approximated by looking at the literature to see just how many scholars adapted and employed it in their work. Wildavsky was quick to describe budgeting in incremental terms in the 1960s. I feel that a case could be made that in 1952 Verne Lewis did the same when he said that comparisons must be made between sacrificed alternatives and that budget variation should be analyzed as how much the current budget departs from last year's budget.
Weaknesses are noted also. There is debate over empirical evidence, for example. Rubin and Joseph White have differing opinions about the strength of empirical evidence for incrementalism in budgeting. Wildavsky's regression study of the 1970s has come under challenge by scholars suggesting that random numbers can produce similar results as his. They contend that he did not control for colinearity-- that produced the results that falsely supported his model.
There are a number of other models of decision making and public policy. Lasswell's call in 1951 for more work in this area has been richly rewarded. In the 1960s, Amitai Etzioni combined the rational model and the incremental model in what he calls mixed scanning. He compared mixed scanning to the weather satellite approach of employing a wide range lense to get the big picture or capture everything while simultaneously employing another satellite with a zoom lense to closely capture and scrutinize important areas.
Another popular model often is identified as the plural model or pluralism. (Some scholars such as Earl Latham and Thomas Dye have used the classification term "group model" for pluralism.) Kelso (1978, 1995) identifies three kinds of pluralism: Laissez faire pluralism, corporate pluralism, and public pluralism.
Laissez faire pluralism finds its scholarly foundations in the works of individuals such as Robert Dahl, Herbert Kaufman, Charles Lindbom, David Truman, Kornhauser, and Banfield. This model suggests that groups form and compete in the free market of politics. Policy entrepreneurs are free to operate in this self-regulating and self-driven environment. Government can intervene, but the costs are so high that most politicians simply do not buck the system.1
Corporate pluralism finds support in the writings of McConnell and Theodore Lowi's notion of interest group liberalism. Corporate pluralists see the process as made up of semi-monopolistic groups who agree not to compete in certain areas. Proponents of this model feel that such an arrangement enhances the chances of an efficient and professional administration developing.
Finally, Kelso identifies public pluralism and links it with Arthur Schlesinger and Alexander George. This model suggests that government should step in and broker the competition. Government should set up groups for under-represented minority interests and strengthen them as needed to maintain a healthy balance of power.
Another prominent model is the elite model. Major proponents of this model can be identified as Thomas Dye, C. Wright Mills, Vilfredo Pareto, Harmon Zeigler, and Putnam. Elite model proponents suggest that the masses do not influence public policy and decision making very much. Instead, an elite or select group from the upper socioeconomic strata influences the masses and imposes their wishes on them. Elites are a relatively homogeneous group who occasionally supplement their membership with a new, fully indoctrinated member, but only after that member can prove their loyalty and can become a part of the elite.
A growing group of scholars are interested in the public choice model. Some of this model's main proponents are Kenneth Arrow, James Buchanan, Anthony Downs, Gordon Tullock, and Riker. I feel that this model is very similar to Kelso's laissez faire pluralism model.
There are other models, such as David Easton's systems model (1965) that could be mentioned. Many of these models overlap and can be linked differently according to the whim of the one performing the categorizations. However, I feel that in selecting a model and building a case that it offers the best explanation of public policy decisions, a strategy for evaluating models should be employed.
In evaluating policy models, I feel that McCool's 1995 book on policy analysis compiles the best set of criteria I have found for performing this task. I will list some of the criteria he suggests below and offer brief explanations of them (in the form of questions that must be answered). Before continuing, McCool is quick to point out a couple of caveats to his criteria: the criteria may not fit the social sciences very well and no model can meet all the criteria.
Validity
Does the model really say what it purports to say? Is it capable of making such statements?
Causal Explanation
Is there a "cause-and-effect" relationship between the independent and dependent variables?
Honest Theory
Is the theory or model useful in dealing with values? That is, is it a normative model disguised as an empiric one?
Objectivity
Does the model or theory leave values out and deal simply with fact?
Predictability
Does the model allow one to extrapolate into the future based on its causal explanatory powers?
Power
Is the model generalizable to other phenomena or able to deal with big problems?
Economy
Is the explanation offered by the model larger than the phenomenon being observed? Is it the simplest explanation available for dealing with the phenomenon?
Reliability
Can the results be repeated or duplicated using a similar research approach?
Heuristic
Is it a tool for obtaining more questions and information? Does it help us direct future research?
Understandability/ Organization
Does it enhance our understanding or organization of the seemingly chaotic environment?
Relevance/ Usefulness
Is the model or theory of value in terms to being able to be used to explain reality?
Testable
Can it be tested? Are the variables sufficiently operationalized to allow quantitative or qualitative testing?
I feel that in light of the above criteria (even though all do not apply), the incremental model remains the best for explaining public policy decision making. As a final step, let us take four of these criteria-- causal explanation, power, economy, and understandability/organization-- and apply them to the incremental model and the rational model and assess how they fare.
empirically tested the incremental model and found a great deal of correlation between actual data and the incremental model. Joseph White has added the notion of "shift points" to the incremental model and suggests that apart from periodic non-incremental change usually after an election, the incremental model appears to be able to explain the direction of budgetary policy.
I feel that compared to the set of criteria provided by McCool and discussed above and the broad base of support found in the literature and (in my opinion) the lack of a better explanation or model, incrementalism remains the most complete explanation for the public policy decision making process, particularly those relating to budgeting. I feel that the incremental model has contributed greatly to our understanding of the way politics and budgets work. Charles Lindblom and Aaron Wildavsky, I feel in particular, are justified for the prominent positions they occupy in the field. We are truly indebted to them for their insight.
ENDNOTES
1. I was surprised to find that Kelso included Lindblom in the laissez faire pluralism camp; however, upon further reading, I feel that Lindblom's incrementalism supports the notion that political players are often unwilling to fight the political system because the costs are too high. Instead, they are satisfied to simply squabble over the marginal increment of change and protect their base and its sunk costs.
2. Rational model assumptions include the following: humans are capable of obtaining and processing an almost infinite amount of information, decision makers know all the preferences and utility functions of their constituents, and only value-maximizing behavior is found. Simon demolished all these assumptions in my opinion, way back in the 1940s.
Question: The U. S. Supreme Court has struck down many aspects of affirmative action as unconstitutional. At the same time, most employers that have instituted voluntary affirmative action programs have argued that the benefits of a diversified work force in terms of gender, race, ethnicity, etc. far outweigh the perceived negative consequences of such programs.
First, discuss the distinction between voluntary affirmative action programs and court-ordered affirmative action programs.
Second, what types of benefits -- social, financial, and economic -- do you think that most employers have enjoyed as a result of having a diversified work force? Explain some of the historical as well as contemporary advantages -- financial, social, cultural, and other -- that white males have enjoyed and continue to enjoy in the job market and public organizations as a result of traditional preferential treatment.
Voluntary affirmative action programs are those implemented by employers as a strategy to achieve an organizational objective. Two types of voluntary programs exist. One designed to meet the minimal requirements of the law as a condition of doing business. The second type of voluntary program are truly "voluntary," meaning that no outside influence is involved in the decision to adopt such a program. The strategic reasons may be different from company to company, but is usually driven by profit.A court-ordered affirmative action plan is one that requires an employer to take certain, almost always, specific measures to rectify past discrimination within the company. In a court ordered affirmative action program, usually a finding of discrimination is present and becomes part of the official record. This process is very often driven by conflict. A court-ordered affirmative action program includes two forms: the first being a decision by a court of competent jurisdiction that discrimination has occurred, while the second method is a court- ordered consent decree. In the second scenario, the employer and the affected employees (and the government) have the opportunity to negotiate the terms of the agreement. However, which employees are involved in the consent decree process has become the subject of subsequent court action in some settings.
These strategic reasons vary from setting to setting. One employer might determine that its product line makes it a likely contractor for a government agency such as the Department of Defense. This employer could choose to implement an affirmative action program in advance
of competing for contracts from the federal (or other) government as a strategy to improve its success rate in the bid process. In this instance its advantage would be the ability to implement the affirmative action plan in the absence of a mandate--executive/administrative or judicial-leaving more discretion with the company. The advance implementation would also lessen the perceived impacts of the requirements to be imposed on the company at the time the company became a government contractor.Another economic reason to institute a voluntary affirmative action plan is marketing. If the company's product line is more attractive to one segment of society than another, then it is in the corporate best interest to increase its workforce's composition within that portion of society buying its products. Also, a national company might operate in multiple locations; locations where the demographics differ significantly. Obvious examples include chain restaurants, various types of distributorships (beer, liquor, route sales, etc.), and professional agencies like insurance that serve a varied clientele. In a given neighborhood it makes economic sense for the workforce (and franchise ownership) to reflect it customer base.
At the social level, some employers may choose social equity as a corporate goal. This choice may still have other normative underpinnings, since it is difficult to separate "facts from values." Social equity becomes a corporate goal when certain facts are taken into account and operationalized by the company. It is clear that reports such as Workplace 2000 alerted a number of employers to the fact that the United States labor force was changing and that in some types of jobs a shortage of workers might occur. This factual realization served to change human resource professionals as well as other manager's minds about the likely future composition of the work force.
One outcome of a "social equity" corporate goal may be a planned effort to compete for the best and brightest of this new workforce. The "value" of social equity through embracing work force diversity sets the tone for the entire company; changing the organizational culture to achieve the strategic goal It may occur to some managers that if it is obvious that the workforce is changing, then it is also a logical assumption that each existing employer will be competing for workers in this changed environment. While tacitly acknowledging diversity may improve the organization's "fit" to its environment, it will not improve its overall effectiveness.
Improving corporate effectiveness in this changing environment becomes the practical effect of social equity becoming a social goal for an organization. As the workforce changes, then those employers who can attract the "best and the brightest" are the most likely to succeed. If the organizational culture sends the message that diversity is just "tolerated" and that employees and managers alike really wish for the "old days," then recruitment and retention of qualified employees will be difficult. On the other hand, if the organization truly embraces the notion of a diverse workforce and makes the related changes to embrace diversity, then the employer is more likely to be successful in increasing their pool of available, quality applicants for each opening. This is how a social goal can become a corporate goal. In the larger sense, employers benefit from a diverse workforce, and these benefits--in some cases--are not readily apparent or short-term in nature. First, the organization and its environment improve "fit" to each other. Adapting Krislov's representativeness argument, then it is useful for all segments of society to be included in the make up of an organization. This is a meta-value that extends beyond the immediate impact on the bottom line because in some instances, costs must go up in the area of training and recruitment to implement this objective. It s a meta-value because it is grounded in the belief that it is important for all viewpoints of society to be present, and that these viewpoints should be considered in decisions made by the company. Under these circumstance the company will be better able to both survive and thrive. Another meta-value is an improved ability to harness all of the available resources of society. Organizations that do not embrace gender, racial, and ethnic diversities deny the organization of the contributions of those excluded. As Drucker, Bennis, and Reich have predicted, discontinuous change has become commonplace. As the knowledge society and economy replace the manufacturing economy, organizations will have fewer layers of management and be connected or "wired" with new technology. This will require a different type of worker and a different type of "conductor" or manager. The challenge for these organizations will be to respond appropriately and in enough time to maximize its opportunities; the intentional decision to deny an organization available resources is problematic at best and disastrous to the organization at its worst. This is particularly true as the needs to retrain the existing workforce become apparent, and it is a constant battle to change with its environment. Both Linden and Senge have described the possibilities of innovation and evaluation leading to an organization becoming a "learning organization." These pressures will be sufficient to drive organizations unable to adapt out of existence. It is an unnecessary burden to add to these pressures additional, unnecessary conflicts over workforce make up.
A final meta-value is the true orientation of an organization toward individuals. This has been a concern of public administration since Follett, Barnard, and Mayo near the turn of the 20th century. Chris Argyris has developed a theory that the needs of the individual are not served by the modem, formal organization. Hersey and Blanchard have described his theory as the
Immaturity--Maturity Theory. In essence, the formal (centralized hierarchical) organization requires mature individuals to be treated as if they are immature and, as a result, they act immature. This is a powerful indicator of the true value placed on the individual employee by an organization. How individuals are valued is also reflected in the organizations response to the diversity question. Organizations can use this issue as a method to examine its treatment of the individual as a part of its strategy to become diverse.
the Western tradition has been one of white male dominance of organizations and institutions, private, public, and religious. The structure of society itself and the role of women and people of color has been one of subservience. In the United States every President has been a white male, all but two members of the Supreme Court have been white, and most members of the Congress have been white males. These same statistics are reflected throughout government at-large over the entire history of the United States.
The response to the issues of diversity has been, like most policies, disjointed and fragmented. The use of executive orders and power to end discrimination in the military or as a requirement of contracting with the federal government was the prevailing means in the United States. This is true even after the passage of the landmark civil rights legislation of the 1960's.
The private sector has been no different. Corporate executives and their corporations have traditionally been white males. This has extended to the Board's of Directors, senior management, and the workforce in many instances. While the government mandated an end to discrimination dating back to the Roosevelt administration using executive mostly the executive power of the President, it took a monumental civil rights effort to bring this issue to the forefront for business and industry.
Research has shown that often white males are compensated at a higher level of pay than women and minorities with the same responsibilities and qualifications. This financial discrimination has been shown to begin with entry level jobs and extend up the corporate ladder to the very top. Although recent studies show that women and minorities are better represented, still this representation does not reflect their make up in society as a whole.
Social and cultural artifacts of the focus on the white male dominance in society are reinforced outside of the corporate or government organizational setting by other institutions of society. Fraternal clubs, country clubs, churches, professional organizations all reflect the traditional dominant position of white males. These informal networks and the "old boy" system provide opportunities for business relationships, friendships, and other ties to be formed. These ties then extend to the "world of work" and provide an advantage for those white males with these ties and a disadvantage for those women and minorities without.
Specific social and cultural effects are attending the "right" church where membership is thought to be the movers and shakers of a community, or the advantage of playing golf with your banker and its impact on your access to business capital. Its most troublesome effect is allowing for decisions that are clearly organizational matters to be made within this "old boy" system-outside of the theoretically more diverse government or business organization.
At present, many organizations continue to operate without regard or in open hostility of the coming change in the composition of the workforce. Very few organizations have made the effort with voluntary programs to "embrace" the changes taking place and to become a leader in the field. In fact, it appears that the 1994 federal elections and continuing debate on issues such as immigration are early signs that the system--while still majority white male--is attempting to forestall the winds of change silently moving through the demographics of the nation. The notion of the "angry white male" typifies such thinking.
Although the demographics are clear (and will soon be even clearer after the census in the year 2000) many are not aware that a change is taking place. While many large, national companies are quietly laying the foundation for this change, I believe that the pace of such organizational responses have slowed in the middle part of the 1990's as the disagreements over this issue receive more attention. After all, if it is in the corporate best interest to position oneself to deal with such changes, it is not too difficult to understand the unwillingness to be identified as a leader in this change if those with the disposable income today are unhappy about the changes coming tomorrow.
Open hostility is the other current measure of the change taking place. It is unlikely that the pain being experienced by the current system is in and of itself enough to prevent change, it is likely to slow the preparation for change. During the 1990's efforts--for a variety of reasons-have led to public policies and judicial appointments to get "the government out of our lives." One can argue that such changes are necessary to reduce the involvement of the federal government (or return power and responsibility to state and local governments), one cannot help but wonder how much of the attacks on equal employment, affirmative action, immigration, and the like are merely symptoms of this issue. Most likely, more than we would like to admit.
QUESTION: Since the beginning of the 20th century, reform advocates like Cleveland, Willoughby, and Schick have advocated replacing legislative centered-incremental budget decision making with executive centered-policy based budget decision making. While the actors remain the same, the involvement of given actors in the budget formulation and legislative approval process varies, depending on whether budget decisions are produced by executive centered-policy based systems or legislative centered-incremental systems.
Design two budget decision making systems: one legislative centered that produces incremental decisions and one executive centered that produces based decisions.
After you design your systems, address the question of whether budget allocation decisions are affected by the type of decision making system. Explain and support your answer.
Legislatively-Centered Incremental Budget Decision System
Nocturnal State Department of Public Safety
The Budget Proposal
Each agency and department of government would submit its initial budget request for review by the subcommittee chairman of its Appropriations subcommittee. The budget request submitted by the department would contain a financial budget presentation and a budget summary sheet showing the proposed changes from the current year to the next (increases and decreases) line item by line item. The budget memorandum accompanying the budget request would describe the reasons for the proposed changes. The budget summary and the budget memorandum would be limited to a total of three pages.
The initial review would be conducted by the Appropriations subcommittee which would conduct its own hearing into the agency budget request. The subcommittee would then submit its recommendation to the entire Appropriations Committee for its review and hearing, the report of the subcommittee would be limited to the recommended changes from the current year to the next year (budget under consideration). This process would occur in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. The purpose of the hearings on the budget proposal would be to focus on the proposed changes in the proposed budget, as compared with the prior year budget. Has the cost of utilities increased? How many new patrol cars are being purchased this year? How many personnel vacancies are proposed to be filled this year? How do the proposed changes correspond to the rate of inflation. These hearings would be designed to focus on the proposed increment of change from one year to the next.
Policy Change
Meanwhile, any requested authority changes in the agency or department requests would be referred at the same time to its appropriate committee of jurisdiction. For example, if the
Department of Public Safety requested its next fiscal year budget under this process and the requested budget contained an expansion of its authority (radar enforcement on city streets) or a new activity (state-wide automated finger print system), then the request would also be referred to the committee with jurisdiction over the department, also in each house of the legislature. These committees of jurisdiction would hold subcommittee and full committee hearings into the proposed changes. Decision Process
The decision to increase (or reduce) any aspect of the Department of Public Safety's mission must be made by the committee of jurisdiction prior to the work of the Appropriations subcommittee and full committee. This must occur in each house of the legislature, too. Once the legislature has acted and any change in the department's authorizing legislation is adopted and signed into law by the Governor, then the final budget can be adopted to reflect any changes within the agencies mission, as well as any changes within the operating environment, 1. E. inflation, increased expenses, etc. If the committees of jurisdiction or the Appropriations Committees in each house disagree, then the disagreements would be submitted to a conference committee for review and compromise.
Accountability
At the end of the fiscal year, the office of the auditor would conduct an audit to see if the budget was followed and all of the funds were spent within the approved budget categories. This line-item by line- item evaluation would become the basis for the comparison of the changes proposed in the next budget cycle.
Executive Centered Rational-Comprehensive Budget Decision System
Active State Department of Public Safety
The Department Budget Proposal and Policy Changes
First, the Governor's Office of Policy and Budget Planning would establish the process to prepare the budget proposal for the next budget-cycle. This budget-cycle would be at least two fiscal years in the future. The process would focus each year on reconsidering the "fit" department's mission to the state's adopted strategic plan, an evaluation of the quantitative measurement of the department's performance using the established measures, and a forecast of any changes in the environment that might impact the department's mission.
The Department of Public Safety would begin work on the next budget-cycle using the performance data for the most recently completed fiscal year. It would begin by comparing the actual data with its adopted performance indicators for the just concluded fiscal year. These performance indicators would help to determine if the agency was successful in meeting its assigned mission, as outlined in the Active State Strategic Plan. The Department of Public Safety's mission and performance indicators would be found in the functional classification "Public Safety" which includes the State Fire Marshall's Office, the Emergency Management Agency, Criminal Justice Planning, and some component parts of the Department of Corrections and Environmental Quality.
Once the data for the prior fiscal year was available and compared to the expected
performance, then the Department of Public Safety would convene its agency budget proposal
work group which includes staff generalists from the Governor's Office of Policy and Budget
Planning . This team is further organized according to function within the department to address
issues such as "Equipment and Facilities ... .. Communications and Applied Technology," "Human
Resources," etc. These teams would include appropriate staff "generalists" from the department's Program and Policy Planning division who would work with the appropriate line staff.
These work teams would review the existing mission of the department in program terms, they would analyze the progress of the department toward meeting its strategic n-fission as defined by the plan and performance indicators, and it would prepare a summary report for its respective function. These program packages would then be forwarded to the agency-level Program and Policy Planning division where the program generalists and budget analyst would review the information.
At the agency level, the program packages would be comprehensively reviewed by the program generalists and budget analysts in order to prepare a series of options for the management of the agency to consider, prior to the presentation of the package to the Governor's Office of Policy and Budget Planning. Part of this review would be to determine how many, if any of the proposals from the teams contain requests that impact fiscal years beyond the one under consideration. This would help identify the total cost of the proposal, since newly approved units require personnel, equipment, and training. It would also help avoid sudden capital costs that occur when critical equipment needs (such as annual replacement of a portion of the department's fleet) are avoided to obtain one-year, short-term budget advantages.
The Executive Budget Proposal and Policy Changes
The Active State Department of Public Safety's Program and Budget Proposal for the next budget cycle is submitted according to the date established by the Governor's Office of Policy and Budget Planning. The program staff and budget analysts then consider how well the Active State is achieving its strategic plan. Each functional program area is reviewed and all information received in each agency's program and budget proposals are evaluated according to this measure.
The focus of this review process is to insure that the objectives of the state in these broad policy and program categories are being met by the organizational structure of the state. How well the objectives are being met are determined by the use of the established policy goals (Active State Strategic Plan), the functional performance objectives (cross-cutting the current state organizational arrangement, and the performance measures (specific to the work unit involved).The Governor's Office of Policy and Budget Planning would make the necessary program evaluations and finalize the program areas for the coming budget cycle. Once the final program area goals, objectives, and measures are available, then the cost of the plan is determined. All of this information is then compiled into a single document. The single document is then submitted to the Speaker of the House and the Lieutenant Governor for consideration by their respective house of the legislature.
Legislative Consideration and Approval
The Speaker of the House and the Lieutenant Governor then assign the Governor's budget to their respective appropriations committee as a single bill. Any changes sought in program or policy areas are submitted to the committee of jurisdiction; in Active State the committees of jurisdiction correspond to the functional areas contained in the Active State strategic plan. These committees receive one decision package for consideration. Once the committees of jurisdiction in each house have concluded their work, differences ironed out (again using conference committees), and necessary legislative authority enacted and signed by the Governor, then the respective Appropriations Committee can act.
The subcommittee structure of the Appropriations Committee also reflects the functional areas contained in the Active State Strategic Plan, and the Public Safety subcommittee would consider the department's program plan and budget for the coming budget cycle. The entire package would be considered together. Once the subcommittee has concluded its work, then the entire Appropriations Committee would act on the Active State Budget for the coming budget cycle. Performance.
Accountability
The Active State's Auditor would not merely be concerned with the line item expenditure or major category implementation of the state budget. The auditor would probe the development of the performance measures by work units and the internal process of each agency designed to meet the mission of the state strategic plan. Much of this would be focused on the outcomes of the performance measures toward meeting the performance objectives and goals.
In fact, the most likely areas of concern for the state auditor would be the reliability of the performance measures themselves--do they measure what they intend, and the validity of the performance measures--do they accurately depict the performance relevant to meeting the Active State Strategic Plan.DISCUSSIONBudget allocation decisions are affected by the type of decision-making system involved. However, such decisions are also affected by the complexity of the budget decision-making system adopted.
Budget decision-making has been the focus of public administration since its inception.
Cleveland, Willoughby, and Buck focused, respectively, on:
I . A responsible executive to propose a budget to a representative body and then be held accountable for its execution.
The need for a strong budget office The need for the development of a financial plan. At the time of their writings, the control of the budget was seen as a strategic method to reduce corruption and impact public policy. The early part of this century was still focused on efforts to maintain control and accountability. The development of the line item budget and object-level controls such as the post-audit were fully intended to tie the hands of the corrupt political figures. This Bureau.
This notion of accountability and control actually extend beyond early literature on the budget. The earliest writings in the field by Woodrow Wilson (1887), Frank Goodnow (1905), and Louis White (1926) breathe life into the idea of a politics-administration dichotomy. While the debate continues into the existence of such a dichotomy or even if Wilson even intended the meaning usually assigned to it, the fact remains that administration became separate.
This allowed for the later rise of decision theory. Herbert Simon's "bounded rationality" and other contributions to decision-science divide the past from the future regarding budget decision-making. Simon's "bounded rationality' provides the basis for our understanding of incremental decision-making, while Lindbloom's "disjointed incrementalism" provided a firm foundation for its evaluation. Wildavsky would later write one of the definitive works on incrementalism as a budget process and partial political theory. However, "bounded rationality" also provides the point of beginning for policy-based decision- making systems.
Simon, Lindbloom, and Wildavsky's writings allow identification of an incremental system, such as the one used by Nocturnal State in the example above. It favors prior claims over new claims by preserving the budget "base." This "base" is not reopened in each successive budget cycle and those decisions are assumed "decided." These are critical issues for the application of an incremental process in a state such as Nocturnal, since it is evident that few, if any professionals (certainly not policy generalists) exists within the system.
Gosling has reported on the policy impacts of the staffing of state budget offices. He studied three upper Midwestern state where the staff of the budget office is either "traditional" or focused on financial issues, or program-oriented and focused on policy. When the level of available expertise is low and its focus is on accountability--line item by line item, then an incremental system is useful.
Such an incremental system requires little professional staff, since it has a limited focus. It reduces the time required by the elected decision-makers by focusing only on the margin or "increment" of change from the prior year. It is also serial allowing for change to occur over many cycles which allows for slowly building a base for support among those involved, while mitigating the "unintended consequences" of unstudied change.
As mentioned above, "bounded rationality" also provides the beginning point for policy based systems. Simon identified the existence of "bounded rationality," while Lindbloom built a model of disjointed incrementalism. Lindbloom's incremental model is incremental, but that an incremental decision using high-understanding was grounded in rational-comprehensive techniques. Now, in this usage both Lindbloom and Wildavsky seem to believe that incrementalism reflects the political theory of pluralism--at that time the predominant theory.
However, the work of Simon as early as 1949 by the first Hoover Commission would lead to the development of policy-based budget decision systems. Caiden has described three periods of budgeting in the United States:
I . Cleveland's responsible executive and accountability concerns Performance budgeting reflected in the first Hoover Commission report Planning as reflected in the implementation of PPBS.
Performance budgeting, in its simplest terms marks the move away from merely managing numbers in a budget toward some understanding of outcomes. These outcomes can be widgets produced, hours spent in training for war, or clients seen by an agency. It marks the first steps toward the use of policy- based outcomes.
Schick (1966) has described the application of PPBS as being an effort to change the fundamental, repetitive cycle of budgeting to that point (at the federal level) toward one that was future- oriented. Jones has described the application of PPBS in the Department of Defense and found this to be essentially true--particularly for well-settled issues such as the impact of U. S. commitments abroad or treaties on defense spending. He also found that PPBS did not respond well to short-term issues and day- to-day conflicts. Schick (1975) by the time that PPBS had been abandoned by the federal government defended its use by raising its short comings, and are useful as advice for those considering policy-oriented budget decision systems.
Both Schick and Lee have identified the value of policy-oriented budgeting systems as their ability to move the budgeting process itself away from the traditional serial, repetitive nature toward the ability to anticipate the future. While limits are obvious regarding the ability of any organization to accurately forecast the future, policy-oriented budgeting systems allow for the orientation of the budgeting process to become forward, not the current year or backward.
First, they are complicated and require much support, both moral and otherwise from management. It takes time for the newly introduced system to educate, recruit, and train the necessary policy generalists and budget analysts capable of running such a system. This maturation of such a complex system does not follow election cycles or other formal time lines. It is difficult and may well be impossible in some areas of government activity to develop performance goals, objectives, and measures that make sense. If it is difficult to measure, then it will be difficult to accurately incorporate that part of the government in a policy-based budget decision system. The measurement problem is somewhat fundamental and has been widely cited in the literature as a criticism of cost-benefit analysis. Such analysis is closely related to performance measures, and similar difficulties exist. It is difficult to quantify or value certain government activities.
Wildavsky (and to some degree Wildavsky and Pressman in their evaluation research) makes the